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Space Law Arena:
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The most likely way for the world to be destroyed, most experts agree, is by accident. That's where we come in; we're computerproJessionals. We cause accidents. 1

~~ Tar fighting has come a long way from the days of swords and shields.

0/ 0/

~o longer must armed forces rely completely on "arms," or even

"forces," to gain victory on the battlefield. Today, computers are becoming
the weapon of choice for the military warrior. Forget the old standbys of the
M-16, Abrams tank, Nimitz-class carrier, or F-16. As forces become more
computer and technologically dependent, militaries of the future will have a
completely different look. 2 In some respects, this should not surprise us. Technological change has always transformed the means and methods of warfare,
but the pace of transformation has increased dramatically in the past few
decades. While laptops and cyber chips may never completely displace guns
and bullets in the warfighter's arsenal, they certainly will become an increasingly critical part.
Nowhere is this technological transformation more evident than in the areas
of military space resources and information operations. Lasers, electronic pulses,
pinpoint sensing equipment, and a vast array of other sophisticated space systems
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are becoming an ordinary part of our day-to-day military experience. As the latest microchip and computer network capabilities become an integral part of attacking and defending those space systems, the future will be fraught with
dramatic new possibilities. Yesterday's science fiction is becoming today's
reality.

Background
This new reality is already a significant threat to the US national security infrastructure. Consider the evidence. According to former Deputy Defense Secretary John Hamre, one particular Department of Defense (DoD) computer
network is penetrated as often as 10-15 times a day by computer hackers. 3 With
more than 2.1 million computers and 10,000 local area networks, DoD was the
target ofmore than 250,000 detected intrusions in 1998. 4 That figure is even more
astounding when you consider that the Defense Information Systems Agency
(DISA) estimates that only one intrusion out of every 150 is even detected. 5 In
February 1998, while the US was preparing to deploy forces to the Persian Gulf,
a computer attack known as "Solar Sunrise" was initiated against computer systems throughout the Department of Defense. 6 The potential implications of the
attack were sobering:
Someone, or some group of people ... gained root access, systems administrator
status, on over 20 important logistical computers throughout the Air Force and,
subsequently, we leamed throughout the Navy and Army. They could have
therefore crashed the systems. They downloaded thousands ofpasswords and they
installed sniffers and trap doors. And for days, critical days, as we were trying to get
forces to the Gulf, we didn't know who was doing it. We assumed therefore it was
Iraq. We found out it was two 14-year-olds from San Francisco. Was that good
news or bad? If two 14-year-olds could do that, think about what a determined
foe could do.7

"Eligible Receiver" was a cyber attack exercise in June 1997, which was
launched by the Department of Defense against itself to see how well our systems detected and responded to the attack. For days, the attack went undetected.
This exercise demonstrated the ability ofa potential enemy to disrupt computer
operations of major military commands, create large-scale blackouts, and interrupt emergency phone service in Washington, DC. 8 These types of cyberspace
intrusions are not limited to the domain of criminals or terrorist hackers. States
have been, and will continue to be, engaged in the use of information
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operations. They recognize, as does the US, its value in protecting national security interests. 9 There have been reports that during the NATO-led Operation
ALLIED FORCE campaign against Serbia, Serbs hacked into the NATO
World Wide Web pages and flooded e-mail accounts in the US with pro-Serb
messages. 10 The reported Serbian actions, and others like them, demonstrate
that the threat of cyber attack is real. Both the White House and DoD are certainly convinced. In response to the threat against DoD communications systems and other government computer data, the Clinton Administration issued a
White Paper in May 1998 setting forth policy and goals on critical infrastructure
protection. ll In addition, the DoD created the Joint Task Force - Computer
Network Defense12 OTF-CND), which maintains a 24-hour operations center
to provide warnings of cyber attacks on DoD systems. 13
.
Couple the dangers of cyber attacks with our heavy reliance on space systems
and the threat becomes all the more sobering. It is more than just an axiom that
outer space is the proverbial high ground. 14 Access to, and control of, outer
space are fundamental to our nation's economic and military security.1S Moreover, we can no longer take that access and control for granted. While the US
dominates outer space activity today, it is estimated that within the next 10 to 20
years more space-based systems will be available to friendly and unfriendly nations alike. 16 These systems will provide communications, weather, surveillance, and a host of other critical services that will have both a military and
civilian use. Friends and foes will be able to use the same space systems.17
Therein lies one of the dangers.
Modem military forces rely heavily on dual-use telecommunications media,
including telephones, faxes, and e-mail that travel over civilian owned or operated networks. In fact, 95 percent of all DoD telecommunications traffic flows
over public networks.1 8 Telecommunications are a particularly acute vulnerability because ofthis high degree ofdependence by modem militaries. 19 This reliance permeates every facet of society, thus allowing exploitation throughout
the conflict spectrum at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. 2o Because
of their data transfer capacity and mobility, telecommunications are increasingly
important as the critical media by which our national instruments of power are
directed. 21
The threats are real, the vulnerabilities potentially grave, and new computer
technology is largely responsible. Information operations and outer space operations are uniquely intemvined through their mutual reliance on, and vulnerability to, computer technology. Moreover, that technology is changing rapidly.
From a military operation or infrastructure protection perspective, it is difficult
to keep pace with such rapid developments. Equally daunting is the effort to
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apply existing legal regimes to these new technologies. Both information operations and space operations apply military force in a way that challenges traditional international legal norms. Admittedly, such a topic raises far more issues
than can be adequately addressed here. Therefore, this chapter is intended only
as a basic primer to introduce the reader to the international law applicable to information operations that affect military space systems.

Scope and Definition of the Information Operations Concept
It is readily apparent how wide-ranging the computer attack threat to our
national security infrastructure can be. It can include activities such as offensive and defensive electronic jamming, information denial, manipulation
of data, morphing of video transmissions, destruction of hardware, or a
myriad of other techniques to render military weapons and systems ineffective, inoperable, or unavailable at a critical time. In the legal context, information operations-including threats by individuals, organizations, or nations;
actions motivated by goals ranging from monetary greed to terrorist revenge;
and operations with military objectives-touch both international and domestic law.
For our purposes, discussion of information operations is limited to actions
by, or on behalf of, nation States. Moreover, domestic laws and regulations are
not our focus, although there are certainly many regulations that apply.22 Instead, we examine those aspects of public international law relating to outer
space that may have an impact on information operations.
As a starting point, it is necessary to define terms, since "information operations" is not a term of art with a universally agreed upon meaning. Indeed,
the US military services, and the DoD itself, do not use consistent terminology. For example, in the glossary of Doctrine Document 2-5, the Air Force
adopts the DoD definition of "information operations" found in DoD Directive 3600.1: "actions taken to affect adversary information and information
systems while defending one's own information and information systems."23
Yet the Air Force takes the unusual step of qualifying that definition with what
it calls "a more useful working definition," namely, "[t]hose actions taken to
gain, e}.'Ploit, defend or attack information and information systems and include both information-in-waifare and information waifare (emphasis added)."24
Even though the Air Force and DoD definitions emphasize different aspects of
information operations, their concepts, as well as that of the other military services, include both offensive and defensive operations. While we use the term
"information operations" in a very broad sense that includes attacking or
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defending information and information systems, for the purpose of this chapter
we place particular emphasis on computers as the primary means of doing so.

The Importance of 10 to Military Operations
The electron may well be the ultimate precision guided weapon,25 for information is becoming a strategic resource that could prove as valuable and influential in the post-industrial era as capital and labor were in the industrial age. 26 Use
of the term "information operations" signifies a new way ofthinking that recognizes the central importance of modem information systems as force enhancers,
as vitally important targets, as a means of defense, and as cyberweapons that may
be used to attack certain targets. 27
While both netwar and cyberwar28 revolve around infonnation communications
matters, at a deeper level they are forms of war about "knowledge"~bout who
knows what, when, where, and why, and about how secure a society or a military is
regarding its knowledge of itself and its adversaries.
Netwar refers to infonnation-related conflict at a grand [strategic] level between
nations or societies. It means trying to disrupt, damage or moclifY what a target
population "knows" or thinks it knows about itself and the world around it. It may
involve public diplomacy measures, propaganda and psychological campaigns,
political and cultural subversion, deception of or interference with local media,
and efforts to promote a dissident or opposition movement across computer
networks. 29
Daniel Kuehl, Professor of Military Strategy at the National Defense University's School ofInformation Warfare and Strategy, notes that information warfare is intended to "influence the enemy's will and ability to fight so that they
stop fighting and you win. "30
Information is aimed at affecting the enemy's cognitive and technical abilities to
use information while protecting our own-to control and exploit the
information environment. In some ways it is technologically independent in that
operations can be conducted in any of the media of war, not just cyberspace, to
attain that key objective of weakening the enemy's will, but in other ways the
new medium of cyberspace offers a particularly rich environment through which
we can reach those elusive targets, the enemy's will and capability, via the various
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entry ways and connecting points in the information environment, whether they
be hardware, software, or wetware [the human mind].31
The objective of offensive warfare has always been to deny, destroy, disrupt,
or deceive the enemy-either in its employment of forces or in retaining the
support ofits people. 32 Mao Tse-Tung believed that "to win victory we must try
our best to seal the eyes and ears ofthe enemy, making him blind and deaf, and to
create confusion in the minds ofthe enemy commanders."33 Information operations are particularly well suited to sealing the eyes and ears ofthe enemy. By disrupting or denying the flow ofinformation between the enemy's military forces
and its command and control elements, information operations can essentially
render sighdess any enemy commander.34

The Importance of Space Systems to Military Operations
Space denial is an important tenet ofour national defense strategy.35 Inherent in
that tenet is the recognition that control of outer space is essential for victory on
to day's battlefield. Certainly, space power has evolved over the last ten years
from merely being a useful force multiplier to being no less than an "indispensable
adjunct."36 According to one author, "the contemporary reality is that the US
armed forces could not prevail, even against a modesdy competent foe, without the
support ofspace systems."37 Air Force ChiefofStaff General Michael E. Ryan gives
an excellent example ofthe practical use ofspace assets in a deployed environment.
When a U-2 reconnaissance aircraft goes on a mission, the planes can send raw
surveillance data via satellite to intelligence specialists in the United States, who
can analyze it and send it to Operation Allied Force's Combined Air Operations
Center at Vicenza, Italy. The data can then be sent to a pilot flying a strike mission.
All this can be done within minutes and reduces the number of airmen who have
to deploy.38
During Operation ALLIED FORCE in the Balkans, a variety of space assets
were used to support the NATO effort. According to Brigadier General Mike
Drennan, Commander of the 21st Space Wing at Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado, navigation, strike indicators, search and rescue, communications, and
weather images represented just some of the space systems support provided to
commanders in the theater. 39 Additionally, both conventional air-launched
cruise missiles and Tomahawk land-attack missiles launched from ships, as well
as certain other precision guided weapons, owed their success to the Global
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Positioning System (GPS).40 While GPS was designed by the Department of
Defense as a dual-use system, its primary purpose has been to enhance the effectiveness of US and coalition military forces.
Our national space policy expressly recognizes that US national security is dependent upon an ability to maintain access to, and use of, space. 41 At times, our
national security interests may require denial of space to our adversaries. Information operations can playa key role in space control and denial. For instance,
intrusions into an adversary's computer network and manipulation of key data
can prevent a space launch, move an opponent's communications or remote
sensing satellites out of orbit, or preclude satellite data from reaching command
and control centers.

World Wide Availability of Space Data Information
One ofthe realities ofspace denial and space control objectives within our national space policies and military doctrine is that the US does not, and will not,
have exclusive access to space. A growing number of nations and organizations
are obtaining space assets and systems of their own.42 China has a rapidly developing space program, as does Japan, India, Brazil, and, of course, Russia. 43
France, India, and Israel have capabilities in high-resolution satellite surveillance
technology, and this type of data is now commercially available for purchase by
any nation. 44 The US Landsat and the French SPOT [Systeme Pour l'Observation
de la Terre] imaging systems have been around for years, but their technology
continues to improve and become more widely available. 45 For instance, the
French are currendy marketing ten-meter resolution images, while some commercial satellites are now capable ofone-meter resolutions. 46 More recendy, the
European Space Agency has developed Earth Resources Satellites (ERS) 1 and
2, and marketed their synthetic aperture radar (SAR) images. Canadian Radarsat
and the Helios reconnaissance satellite owned by France, Spain, and Italy may
also have future commercial availability.47 A further example of the public commercial availability ofspace system technology is the US' hugely successful GPS,
which, until recendy, enjoyed a near monopoly in space-based navigation technology. Besides the availability ofGPS, Europe is planning to launch its own satellite navigation system called Galileo, projected to be operational in 2008.
As non-US satellite navigation systems are developed and launched,
additional legal issues and national security concerns arise. When a virtual US
monopoly on particular space systems exists, such as there used to be with
GPS, space denial or control is merely a matter of interrupting or encoding the
information from our own systems so that other nations are unable to use i~. 48
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However, when other nations have similar space systems, or can purchase the
infonnation they produce, space denial or control may require more aggressive
means of infonnation operations. The commercial availability of potentially
sensitive data creates obvious risks to national security. According to one analyst,
"Islamic Jihad could get its hands on a one-meter resolution picture of a US Air
Force General's headquarters in Turkey, convert the shot to a precise
three-dimensional image, combine it with data from a GPS device, and transmit
it to Baghdad, where a primitive cruise missile, purchased secretly from China
could await its targeting coordinates."49
Infonnation operations, used to assure US space control by denying its use by
others, will certainly raise eyebrows and stir heated debate in the international
community. Since any decision to employ a military option, especially one affecting outer space or space systems, must weigh political concerns and sensitivities, a consideration of world opinion on the subject is useful.

International Opinion on the Weaponization of Space
Since the Soviet launch of Sputnik in 1957, many nations in the world community have been ardently concerned about preventing the placement ofweapons in outer space, particularly with respect to new weapons technology. As a
result, any potential use of offensive infonnation operations in, or affecting,
outer space will likely aggravate international concerns.
The debate has been polarizing, frequently pitting practical national security objectives against the desire to maintain at least one environmental realm
free from military conflict. Early UN General Assembly resolutions generally
sought to provide that outer space would be used exclusively for "peaceful
purposes," but the tenn was never defined. 50 While nearly all voices claimed
to be in favor ofpeaceful purposes, they were not so hannonious on the degree
of military activity that concept included. The reality, of course, is that outer
space has been a domain of the military since 1957 and has been of significant
importance to the military to the present day. Today, some advocates of the
non-weaponization of space seek to impede further military development of
space with the ultimate hope of curtailing an arms race in outer space. While
opponents of this view are not against "peaceful purposes" per se, they stress
the need to be prepared for war as the best way to protect national interests. 51
In general, the two views are irreconcilable, although there is room for agreement on specific issues.
The United Nations, which includes members on both sides of the debate,
has taken an active role in international space law from the very inception of the
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space age. It has done so primarily through the work of the Committee on the
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS).

Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space
In 1959, the United Nations established COPUOS52 to enhance international cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer space. Since its creation, it has
been the primary forum for the development ofinternational space law. In fact,
COPUOS was the architect for each of the existing five space law treaties. Of
those, four have been ratified by most space-faring nations; together, they comprise the core body of international space law. 53
From its inception, COPUOS has promoted the use and maintenance of
outer space for peaceful purposes. Early work resulted in the adoption of General Assembly Resolution 1721 on December 20, 1961, which stated that "the
common interest of mankind is furthered by the peaceful uses of outer space."54
General Assembly Resolutions 1884 and 1962, adopted two years later, continued that theme. 55 Today, the Committee continues to encourage research and
distribution of information on outer space matters, sponsor various programs and
conferences, and study the legal issues arising out ofspace exploration and activity.56
As its name implies and its work confirms, COPUOS starts from the premise
that outer space should be maintained for "peaceful uses." While this is a term
that everyone has adopted, as noted earlier, there is strong disagreement about its
meaning. Past practice has demonstrated that most COPUOS members believe
military activity in outer space, as potentially contrary to the goals of international peace and security, must be closely scrutinized. In fact, at its fifty-first session, the UN General Assembly passed Resolution 51/44, "Prevention of an
arms race in outer space." Included in that resolution was the statement that the
General Assembly recognizes "that prevention of an arms race in outer space
would avert a grave danger for international peace and security."57 Other General Assembly resolutions contain similar language. 58
The large number of early space treaties and General Assembly resolutions
would ordinarily reflect a committee that works well together. However, that
has not been the case with COPUOS. Its early success in obtaining the first four
treaties was due largely to the fact that compromises on space issues were easier
to obtain before the full potential of space exploration had been fully understood. 59 However, fundamental rifts soon developed within COPUOS, and
have continued, between space and non-space powers. 60 More recenciy, the
United States has found itself on the minority side of several General Assembly
resolutions intended to de-militarize outer space.
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From the perspective of the UN Charter, these resolutions are merely
non-binding recommendations. 61 However, some commentators have asserted
that the "peaceful use" of outer space concept reflects customary international
law,62 and, to the extent it is referenced, therefore believe the General Assembly
resolutions contain legally binding principles. 63 This argument is not particularly helpful since it does not address the meaning of the peaceful use concept. A
more practical concern about these resolutions is whether the underlying viewpoint will ultimately lead to the development ofanother space law treaty which
significantly limits military activity, including information operations, in or
transiting outer space.

Conference on Disarmament
Closely related to COPUOS is the Conference on Disarmament (CD). Also a
creation of the United Nations, it was established in 1979 as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum of the UN. The CD has grown from its
original membership of 40 nations to 66, including the United States. 64 As ,vith
COPUOS, disagreements between CD members exist. These differences were
clearly evident in 1985 when an Ad Hoc Committee, formed to find a means to
curtail the arms race in space, held 20 meetings over a three-month period ,vithout reaching agreement on any of their objectives. 65 The primary catalyst in
forming the Ad Hoc Committee was the US "Strategic Defense Initiative" program. 66 In debating a proposal for an arms control treaty for space, the United
States argued that there was no need for such a treaty since existing treaties were
sufficient. In contrast, the former socialist block nations indicated a ,villingness
to conclude an agreement that would not only prohibit space attack weapons
then under development, but would also require the destruction of existing
weapons. While the Soviet Union accused the United States of"disrupting" and
"hampering" the ratification of several important arms control agreements,
China's tone was at least as emphatic. China made it clear that "the 'Star Wars'
plan must not be carried out" and that "China is firmly opposed to an arms race
in outer space ... and proposes to achieve first 'the de-weaponization of outer
space' at the present stage."67 The nonaligned and neutral States consistently
supported the idea that space weapons must be prevented in outer space at all
costs. 68
A more recent example of this split of opinion is found in General Assembly
Resolution A/52/37, passed in 1997. That resolution called on the CD to
re-examine the idea of establishing another Ad Hoc Committee to address the
issue ofmilitarization ofspace. This issue had re-captured the interest of the CD
274

Douglas S. Anderson and Christopher R. Dooley
in light ofrecent developments in lasers and perceptions that the US was seeking
to weaken the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty.69 Despite the efforts and
objections of the US, the resolution was supported by 128 nations, including
China, Russia, Canada,Japan, Australia, and New Zealand. The US, GreatBritain, and France were among the 39 abstentions.70 Even more recendy, another
General Assembly resolution called for the CD to reestablish the prior Ad Hoc
Committee on the Prevention ofan Arms Race in Outer Space. Adopted on December 4, 1998, by an overwhelming vote of165 to 0, the US was one offour abstentions.71
China has been particularly active in the CD in its efforts to keep outer space
weapon-free. In addition to co-sponsoring several UN General Assembly resolutions, it has also sought to obtain a legally binding international agreement to
ensure outer space remains free ofall weapons. In fact, China published a White
Paper in July 1998 to outline its views on the weaponization of outer space.72
According to this paper, "China stands for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction ofweapons deployed in outer space. "73 Additionally, it seeks a
"ban on the use of force or conduct of hostilities in, from, or to outer space."
China also wants to preclude all countries from experimenting with any space
weapons systems that would provide strategic advantages on the ground. 74
While its latest White Paper does not refer to information operations, the principles
oudined therein seem to imply that China would oppose the use ofinformation operations that could be seen as a "use offorce," the "conduct of hostilities," or as "a
weapon ofany kind" in outer space. Despite this strong language, it is not surprising
to read China's most recent statements, which express an intention not only to use
information operations for military purposes, but to extend their use into space.75
During its 1998 session, the CD included in its agenda the frequendy revisited
topic of the "prevention of an arms race in outer space. "76 During that session,
Canada proposed that the CD create an Ad Hoc Committee, referred to earlier,
,vith the mandate to negotiate a convention for the non-weaponization of outer
space. 77 The Canadian proposal makes two important admissions. First, it recognizes that currendy there is no multilateral international agreement that prohibits the deployment of weapons in outer space other than weapons of mass
destruction. This recognition is consistent with the longstanding US position.
Even more important, however, is the statement that "[w]e acknowledge that
there is currendy no arms race in outer space. We accept the current military uses
of outer space for surveillance, intelligence-gathering and communications."78
Despite these two major concessions, it is nonetheless clear that much of the
world disagrees with current US national and DoD space policy to the extent
that it does not expressly denounce the weaponization of outer space.
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US and DoD Space Policies
The Clinton Administration announced the latest version of the National
Space Policy on September 19, 1996.79 The National Security Space Guidelines
include the principle that the US will conduct its space activities in a way that assures hostile forces cannot deny our use ofspace and preserves our ability to conduct both military and intelligence space-related activities. This makes some in
the international community uneasy.80 The National Space Policy also makes
clear what has been obvious for quite some time-that access to and use ofspace
"is central for preserving peace and protecting US national security."81
In terms ofinformation operations, nothing in our current policy prohibits or
even limits use of such technology to support our space security guidelines. In
fact, it obligates the DoD to "protect critical space-related technologies and mission aspects, "82 and maintain the capabilities to execute traditional mission areas
of space support, force enhancement, space control, and force application. 83
The use of information operations to protect our communication systems and
data links, while being able to interfere with the communications and data ofadversaries, is wholly consistent with National Space Policy guidelines.
Assurance of space access by the US is also included in the Department of
Defense's new space policy set forth in DoD Directive 3100.10. 84 Announced
onJuly 9, 1999, this policy not only echoes the guidance of the National Space
Policy, it also specifically refers to the need to maintain "information superiority."85 Moreover, the wide variety ofinformation operations that could be used
to defend against attacks upon our space systems and to assure space control is
consistent with it.
Recalling the position of many nations involved in COPUOS and the
CD, many of the US national and Department of Defense space policy statements may run counter to the concept of de-militarizing space. 86 Perhaps
most significantly, the first sentence of the DoD policy unequivocally announces that "space is a medium like the land, sea, and air within which military activities shall be conducted."87 Many nations represented in COPUOS
and the CD do not view outer space as analogous to "the land, sea or air," but
rather more like Antarctica, where they have expended much effort to exclude nearly all military activities.
When the statements of scholars and politicians from other nations are
compared generally to those in the US, a clear difference of opinion regarding
the proper role of the military in space, including the use ofinformation operations, emerges. While information operations mayor may not be consistent
with international opinion, they are consistent with both the national and
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DoD space policies. Having considered world opinion on the issue, we tum to
the applicable international law as it relates to infonnation operations in or
transiting space.

Overview of Space Law Applicable to Information Operations
There currently exist no "thou shalt nots" in space law which specifically refer to the tenn or concept of "infonnation operations." In fact, there are very
few specific military activities of any kind that are restricted or prohibited. 88 For
instance, one will not find among the current space law treaties any specific reference to space lasers, anti-satellite weapons, kinetic energy guns, or infonnation operations. For the most part, when examining space law provisions, a legal
practitioner needs to work with general principles that must be applied on a
fact-specific basis. Therefore, we will focus on those laws having a general application to the concept ofinfonnation operations and then apply them to specific
scenarios.
One means of using information operations to protect our national security
interests in space is by controlling our adversaries' access to infonnation through
techniques that will interrupt, interfere with, or deny critical satellite data. At
times, this can be particularly sensitive since denying data to an adversary that
does not own its own space system may require disrupting a third party's space
system. This, in tum, may disrupt access to data for other users who may not be
involved in the conflict with the us. Using infonnation operations for such a
purpose requires careful consideration of the law as well as national policy and
security interests.

US Policy on GPS Data Interference
One such national policy relates to the use of US GPS data. GPS data can be
accessed in two ways. The first is through the nonnal operation mode of the
standard positioning service (SPS). This method allows access by all users, but it
also enables the US to downgrade the data provided to certain users through use
ofvarious degradation technologies and cryptography. The second means ofaccess is the GPS Precision Positioning Service (PPS), which is granted only to
DoD users and enables them to receive a clear signal with properly encrypted
GPS receivers. Thus, the US military could seek to intentionally impair the navigational signals released by its global navigation system in the SPS mode to protect national security interests. 89 Such interference would only temporarily
prevent commercial users and others from obtaining the same quality of
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infonnation the US needs for its military operations. It would also be preceded
by a public notice warning other users of the intentionally impaired signals.
Since this particular GPS belongs exclusively to the US, the United States can set
appropriate limits on its use by third parties.
However, on March 29, 1996, the Clinton Administration announced a new
national policy that would eventually remove prior military restrictions on the
management and use of the US-owned GPS. As part of that new policy, the US
committed itself to "discontinue the use of GPS Selective Availability (SA)
within a decade in a manner that allows adequate time and resources for our military forces to prepare fully for operations without SA. "90 The policy also stated
that GPS would be provided free of charge to the rest of the world for peaceful
uses on a continuous basis.
This current policy should not unduly limit DoD infonnation operations activities designed to impair or interrupt US GPS signals when necessary. By its
terms, the policy allows the US to continue selective availability measures until
alternative measures allow military forces to operate without them, even if the
data is used for peaceful civil, commercial, and scientific purposes. Secondly, the
policy directs the DoD to develop measures to prevent the hostile use ofGPS,91
including defensive infonnation operation measures. Finally, in the case of actual anned conflict, this internally imposed policy decision would not preclude
military use of infonnation operations to affect an adversary's ability to use the
GPS system, if deemed necessary for national security purposes.

United Nations Treaties and Pronouncements
1. Ollter Space Treaty
Although it was not the first international agreement to refer specifically to outer
space,92 the Outer Space Treaty which entered into force on October 10, 1967,93
has become the cornerstone multilateral agreement dealing with the use of space.
Frequendy described as the "Magna Carta" of outer space,94 its significance cannot
be over emphasized. It provides the basic framework ofinternational space law, incorporated many ofthe principles set forth earlier in the non-binding 1963 Declaration ofPrinciples,95 has been the basis ofsubsequent space law treaties, and contains
several provisions "that have general application to information operations.
Article 1(1) obligates parties to use outer space "for the benefit and in the interest of
all countries" and provides that it is "the province of all mankind." Some scholars have asserted that this language means that States cannot encroach upon, or
interfere with, the lawful activities ofother States. 96 This language does not, however, impose any legal constraints on military operations properly authorized
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under international law. For example, military action pursuant to a Chapter VII
Security Council resolution is, of course, an authorized activity for the benefit
and in the interest ofall countries, given the UN's authority to use force to protect international peace and security.
Article 1(2) e:l!..-pands on the use limitations of the first paragraph, stating that
outer space shall be "free for exploration and use by all States without discrimination of any kind." This language affinns the principle of free access to space
and prohibits interference with that access. 97 The language ofparagraph two also
contains an important condition that the use of outer space be "in accordance
,vith international law. " Thus, if the military action is otherwise lawful, the fact
it is conducted in outer space or through infonnation operations does not violate
this provision.
Closely related to the freedom of access principle is the non-appropriation
principle contained in Article II, which provides that outer space "is not subject
to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty." While this language might
suggest that infonnation operations used to interfere with satellite signals or data
are an act of unlawful appropriation of another State's space system, that view
goes too far. Interference with a sovereign object is not the same as asserting a
sovereign interest over outer space should that object be located there. Only the
latter would violate the non-appropriation principle of Article II. The Law of
the Sea Convention has similar language regarding claims over the high seas,98
but it clearly has allowed use of the high seas by military warships (sovereign objects) ,vithout recognizing that interference with them constituted a claim ofnational appropriation over the high seas. Absent a claim of sovereignty over the
high seas, interference with warships on the high seas has not been deemed
equivalent to an unlawful appropriation. In both cases, what is prohibited is the
assertion of territorial claims. 99
Another potential limitation on infonnation operations is contained in Article IV. This article contains the key provisions relating to military activity in
space. Paragraph 1 prohibits nations from orbiting, installing on celestial bodies,
or stationing in outer space any nuclear weapons or "any other weapons ofmass
destruction." The meaning of the tenn "weapons ofmass destruction" (WMD)
has "typically been defined as weapons that are intended to have indiscriminate
effect upon large populations and large geographical areas. "100 It is generally accepted to include nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. lOl Even though
WMD could also include other weapons, notwithstanding the Russian position
statement to the contrary,102 the use ofan infonnation weapon is not likely to be
viewed by the US as a weapon of mass destruction. l03 Ordinarily, its effects can
be controlled so as not to destroy large numbers of people. For example, the
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selective disabling by infonnation operations of a particular computer system
does not come within the meaning ofWMD in Article IV.
For the most part, Article IV, paragraph 2, deals with the moon and other celestial bodies. Among other restrictions, it states that, "[t]he moon and other celestial bodies shall be used by all States Parties to the Treaty exclusivel}'for peactifill
purposes." It also states that" [t]he use of military personnel for scientific research
orfor an}' other peaceful purposes shall not be prohibited." Despite the fact that the
"peaceful purposes" language does not expressly refer to the domain of outer
space, historically the US and other nations have generally agreed that activities
in outer space should also be confined to peaceful purposes. 10ol Nonetheless, it
has been the US view that the peaceful purpose language does not preclude lawful military activity. lOS While this conclusion seems clear, determining which
military activities in outer space are considered "peaceful"106 has been a topic of
contentious debate. Indeed, from the moment the Outer Space Treaty was
drafted, the international community has been divided on this issue. 107
Advocates for the position that the "peaceful purposes" language excludes all
military activity other than scientific research often cite to similar language in the
Antarctic Treaty of 1959108 and the conforming practice of nations in
Antarctica. However, such a comparison is both misleading and inappropriate.
Article 1, paragraph 1 ofthat treaty states that" Antarctica shall be used for peaceful purposes only." While this portion of the treaty is similar to the "exclusively
for peaceful purposes" language of the Outer Space Treaty, the analysis is inapt.
What many of these advocates fail to mention is additional language that is not
found in the Outer Space Treaty. Immediately following the reference to
"peaceful purposes," the teA1: of the Antarctic Treaty states that "[t]here shall be
prohibited, inter alia, any measures of a military nature .... " It is the additional
language contained in the Antarctic Treaty, and not found in the Outer Space
Treaty, that distinguishes the interpretation of the "peaceful purposes"
language. Furthennore, State practice in Antarctica in 1959, when the treaty was
drafted, was exclusively non-military while State practice in space in 1967, when
the Outer Space Treaty was signed, was overwhelmingly military in nature.
The US view that Article IV does not preclude lawful military activity is also
supported by the historical context in which the Outer Space Treaty came into
existence. When the Outer Space Treaty was signed, its two primary drafters,
the US and the Soviet Union, were already using outer space for military purposes. It is unlikely that the Outer Space Treaty was intended to proscribe existing practice by its two primary drafters. 109 The idea that "peaceful purposes"
meant at least some military use was also consistent with the US space policy at
the time. For instance, President Eisenhower declared to Congress, when the
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National Aeronautical and Space Administration (NASA) was established, that
the US was committed to the principle that" outer space be devoted to peaceful
and scientific purposes."110 Similarly, the Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958
contained language that "it is the policy of the United States that activities in
space shall be devoted to peaceful purposes for the benefit of all mankind."111
Despite use ofsuch language, that same act provided for military departments to
conduct space activities, including the development of weapons systems, military operations, and the defense of the US. Thus, the US has never interpreted
"peaceful purposes" to mean only non-military activity. Rather, the US position has consistently been that the concept of "peaceful purposes" only prohibits
aggressive military activity contrary to international law. 112 In 1962, Senator Albert Gore, Sr. stressed this distinction before the UN General Assembly. He
urged that the "test of any space activities must not be whether it is military or
non-military, but whether or not it is consistent with the UN Charter and other
obligations oflaw."113 While this view is not held by all,114 it now appears to
represent the international consensus115 and is consistent with Article III of the
treaty, discussed later. Therefore, any information operations undertaken in
self-defense pursuant to a Security Council resolution, or in accordance with
any recognized lawful purpose, would not be prohibited by either Article IV or
other portions ofthe Outer Space Treaty. Moreover, during any period ofinternational armed conflict, it is unlikely that these provisions would even apply between the belligerents who were parties to the treaty. While there are several
views as to the test for when a treaty is abrogated or suspended by war between
belligerent parties, the fundamental principle is the compatibility between the
particular treaty provisions at issue and a state ofwar or armed conflict. Since the
issue depends on the "intrinsic character" of the treaty provisions in question,116
to the extent the Outer Space Treaty provisions being discussed here are incompatible ,vith the object and purpose ofarmed conflict, they would most likely be
suspended.
Finally, Article IX has the most direct application to the issue of information
operations that interfere with the use ofouter space by other nations. Indeed, the
language of this article echoes principles enunciated earlier in the 1963 Declaration. In addition to requiring all States to conduct their activities in outer space
"with due regard" for the interests of other States, it goes on to declare the
following:
If a State Party to the Treaty has reason to believe that an activity or experiment
planned by it or its nationals in outer space, . . . would cause potentially harniful
i/lter[ere/lcnvith activities ofother States Parties in the peaceful e:l'..-ploration and use
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of outer space, ... it shall undertake appropriate international consultations before
proceeding with such activity.... (emphasis added)

Through this provision, the Outer Space Treaty made legally binding the 1963
Declaration's principle of prior consultation based on the potential for hannful
interference in the space activities of another State.
Although the provisions cited above are likely to be interpreted in the international community to mean that "hannful interference" is prohibited, there are
two important limitations to this prohibition as applied to information operations.
The first is that the interference must be directed toward the "peaceful" use of
space by other States. It is clear that a State may lawfully interfere with the space
activities of other States when such activities are pursuant to a lawful use of military force. The second limitation is that the interference to the space system of
another must be "hannful." Information operations that intrude upon, tap into,
or monitor other space systems communications or other data for a military purpose can arguably be conducted without "harming" the space system of the
other State, and to the extent they do no harm, they do not violate Article IX of
the Outer Space Treaty.117 Of course, regardless ofsuch an argument, the State
whose system was intruded upon would probably beg to differ. In fact, even if
the intrusion were deemed not to violate Article IX, the political fallout could
be extremely problematic.
Article III is perhaps the most important and illuminating of all the Outer
Space Treaty provisions, the one which puts all the others into proper context. Article III states that the Parties "shall carry on activities in the eA-ploration and use of outer space ... in accordance with international law, including the
Charter of the United Nations, in the interest of maintaining international peace
and security . . . ." (emphasis added) It is this standard, far more than the
oft-cited concept of peaceful purposes, that is central to whether or not activities in outer space comply with the Outer Space Treaty. While academic discussions will invariably center around the peaceful purposes language, military
commanders, planners, and operators who are considering activities in outer
space should focus instead on whether the military activity is la"rfuJ. under the
traditional law of armed conflict. If a nation's military activities are conducted
"in accordance with international law" and the Charter of the UN, then the
Outer Space Treaty recognizes that such activities can be in the interest of international peace and security. Consequently, it is Article III, not Article IV,
that should be the primary focus of attention. Since the UN Charter is one of
the standards cited in Article III, it is appropriate that we tum to that
instrument.
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2. UN Charter
Article 1 of the UN Charter expressly states that the purpose of the UN is to
"maintain international peace and security." Accordingly, military activities
aimed at restoring peace and conducted pursuant to a UN mandate or otherwise
consistent with the Charter would be for a peaceful purpose. Article 39 of the
Charter authorizes the Security Council to determine if a threat to peace, a
breach ofpeace, or an act ofaggression exists such that measures to restore international peace and security are required. Included among the lawful measures
that the Security Council is authorized to direct in restoring peace and security
are those set forth in Article 41, which include "the complete or partial interruption of. .. rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means ofcommunication"
(emphasis added). Clearly, information operations which have the effect ofinterrupting communications, and which are conducted pursuant _to Article 41,
would not only be lawful but an act undertaken to maintain or restore international peace and security. Therefore, such information operations would also be
consistent \vith the Outer Space Treaty.
The UN Charter goes even further in allowing for military action to maintain
or restore international peace and security. Article 42 authorizes "such action . . . as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security" when Article 41 measures would be, or have proven to be, inadequate. By it,
the Security Council has the authority to direct its members to "use all necessary
means" to carry out Chapter VII peace enforcement measures, and, indeed, past
resolutions such as Security Council Resolution 678 (DESERT STORM) in
1990118 and Security Council Resolution 1264 (East Timor) in 1999119 have contained this language. Coupled with the "all necessary means" language of a Security Council resolution, Article 42 allows information operations of far greater
scope than merely interrupting communications, as authorized by Article 41. In
determining the lawfulness of a particular information operation, it is necessary to
evaluate the factual context, not just the type ofinformation operation conducted.
Information operations can also be undertaken for purposes of individual or
collective self-defense, an inherent right ofall nations clearly recognized by Article 51 of the Charter. The mere fact that information operations affect space systems, or are conducted from outer space, does not make those op~rations illegal.

International Consortia and Other International Agreements
1. Intemational Telecommtmications Convention (ITC)
The ITC is the basic charter for the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), one of the oldest existing international organizations. 120 The ITU
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direcdy oversees the communications satellite industry, arguably the most important sector of outer space activity.121 A specialized agency of the United Nations since 1945,122 it has been used by the UN to promote international
cooperation in space123 through the regulation of telecommunication services
and allocation of radio frequencies.
Article 45(1) of the most recent ITU Convention, which was adopted in
Geneva in 1992 and amended by the Plenipotentiary Conference at Kyoto in
1994, requires that all telecommunication stations operate so as not to cause
"harmful interference" to the radio service or communications of other Members.1 24 The convention defines "hannful interference" as "[i]nterference
which endangers the functioning of a radionavigation service or of other
safety services or seriously degrades, obstructs or repeatedly interrupts a
radio-communication service operating in accordance with the Radio Regulations. "125 According to at least one scholar, the term is intended to be broadly
interpreted and covers "any kind of damaging or destructive activity. "126 While
this interpretation may have some academic value, it is not widely held, is not
consistent with the express language ofthe lTC, and certainly does not represent
the position of the United States. 127
Information operations, such as implanting a trap door into the communications network of a potential adversary or setting up another type of then benign, but potentially destructive, cyber agent in the telecommunications
system of another State, might be seen by some as "harmful interference." Arguably, because the purpose of its presence is to enable harmful interference or
provide destructive capability when needed, the fact that an information operation mechanism is currendy benign does not mean it is non-harmful. It would
be difficult to show that this type of interference endangered the functioning
of a service, seriously degraded it, or served to repeatedly interrupt it. However, even if there were found to be "harmful interference" from the activity,
if the implanting oflatent viruses or other cyber instruments were taken against
a military network of another State, there would be no ITC violation. The
ITC restrictions provide a recognized exception for "military radio installations" through Article 48(1). A more difficult situation arises when the activity
affects a dual-use civilian telecommunication system, one used for both civilian
and military purposes.
Finally, the ITC does not provide for its continued application between Party
belligerents during armed conflict. Since its provisions are not compatible ,vith
the object and purpose of such hostilities, they will likely b~ considered suspended between the belligerents throughout the duration of any international
armed conflict. 128 Thus, the only time the provisions in the ITC would apply
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and possibly restrict some types ofinformation operations would be when they
do not rise to such a conflict level.

2. INTELSAT Agreement of1973
Through the International Telecommunications Satellite Consortium
(INTELSAT), the US initiated the first worldwide commercial telecommunications satellite system. 129 Created to encourage global nation-to-nation public
satellite service,130 INTELSAT reflects the US view ofspace law and policy. For
example, \vithin its basic structure, the consortium allows nations to invest and
own shares in the organization, instead ofit being organized along the old onenation, one-vote concept. This voting and profit sharing formula reflects the US
positions that space is to be used for the "benefit of mankind," and that the
"province of mankind" does not require an equal apportioning of space
wealth. 131 Despite these "American" views of space law, the Soviet Union
joined INTELSAT in 1991;132 there are currendy 143 member countries.
INTELSAT operates the world's most extensive global communications satellite system in existence, and DoD has been a user of the system from its advent. 133
Articles III (d) and (e) of the INTELSAT Agreement describe military use of
INTELSAT services. These provisions set forth a clear proscription on using
"specialized telecommunications services" for military purposes. However, that
proscription does not preclude INTELSAT from providing standard "public
telecommunications services" to a military force for a military purpose. 134 In
fact, according to a COMSAT legal opinion, aside from the limitation on using
"specialized" services, "there is nothing in the INTELSAT Agreement that prohibits or discourages the use ofINTELSAT for either US national security or intelligence purposes."135
The more difficult issue is the interruption, denial, or even destruction, ofthe
data or data links from an INTELSAT system. There is nothing in the
INTELSAT Agreement136 that specifically prohibits interference with communication systems, although it certainly is implied throughout the agreement. 137
For example, Article XIV(d) of the agreement requires a party or signatory to
consult with the Assembly ofParties and furnish all relevant information prior to
using an INTELSAT space segment in a way that might prejudice the establishment of direct telecommunication links of other members.
INTELSAT's requirements ofprior consultation and disclosure in advance of
an operation would be completely unfeasible in the context of a military information operation. Absent some agreement with the members to the contrary, a Security Council resolution authorizing "all necessary means" under a
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Chapter VII action, or some other lawful justification, this INTELSAT provision could serve to require disclosure and thus limit peacetime military information operations activities that interrupt, deny, or destroy another's data from an
INTELSAT service. However, as with the other international agreements, during a period ofinternational armed conflict, these limiting INTELSAT requirements will likely be viewed as suspended between the parties to the conflict, thus
allowing jamming, destruction of ground stations belonging to an adversary, or
other information operations. 138

3. INMARSAT Convention
The International Maritime Satellite Organization (INMARSAT) was
formed in 1976139 to extend the INTELSAT framework to include maritime
communications and certain maritime nations excluded from INTELSAT.140
While its purpose was to provide space connections necessary to improve maritime and aeronautical communications, it has expanded into other systems, such
as mobile communications. 141
Article 3(3) ofthe INMARSAT Convention142 provides that "the Organization shall act exclusively for peaceful purposes." Initially, INMARSAT took the
view that military uses per se were not compatible with peaceful purposes unless
they were for distress and safety or purposes recognized by international humanitarian law. 143 Much like the Outer Space Treaty, the INMARSAT Convention, in Article 12(1)(b), obligates the INMARSAT Assembly of Parties to
ensure its activities are consistent with the UN Charter. INMARSAT's "peaceful purposes" language must therefore be read in the context ofthe UN Charter.
When that is done, it becomes clear the INMARSAT Convention does not
prohibit military action conducted under the auspices of the UN Security
Council, legitimate individual or collective self-defense, or military action that is
otherwise consistent with international law.
A recent privatization development, however, may have rendered the entire
discussion over the meaning of "peaceful purposes" in the convention moot.
On April 15, 1999, the assets and liabilities of the INMARSAT intergovernmental organization were transferred to a private company called, for lack of a
better term, "new INMARSAT. "144 The new company's legal obligations arise
out of its Memorandum of Association (MOA) and the Public Services Agreement (PSA) between it and the residual INMARSAT organization. The MOA
requires new INMARSAT to "have due regard" for certain principles, including the "peaceful purposes" principle, but COMSAT's lawyers have taken the
position that this language only requires the company to take those principles
into consideration.1 45
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Similarly, while clause 2.3 of the PSA provides that "[t]he Company shall act
exclusively for peaceful purposes," the INMARSAT Assembly believed this
language was political in nature and without an enforcement mechanism for alleged violations. 146 Therefore, according to the April 15, 1999, COMSAT
General Counsel Opinion, "COMSAT envisions no circumstances in which
the 'peaceful purposes' principle would be invoked as a reason to deny service to
the US Department of Defense or units thereo£"147 That opinion, however,
does not address whether "harmful interference" with a member's
INMARSAT space segment or communication link would constitute a violation ofits "peaceful purposes" language. Since the new organization is still based
on the INMARSAT Agreement, it is not clear to what extent a member might
seek to claim a violation ofthe provisions of that agreement. On the other hand,
since new INMARSAT is now privatized, perhaps the only remedy to the private company shareholders would be contractual in nature. Regardless, potential disputes with offended nation shareholders will likely be avoided if the
proposed military action is taken pursuant to the UN Charter or other internationallaw.

4. Arms Reduction Treaties
Arms reduction treaties also contain provisions affecting the use of information operations. For instance, the ABM Treaty, in Article XII (2) , was the first to
preclude any activity which interfered with the "national technical means of
verification" of treaty compliance by the other Party. Most other arms reduction
treaties, such as SALT II and the START Treaty, have similar language.1 48
While these formerly bilateral treaties are limited in the number of Parties involved, and there are concerns about what constitutes an unlawful interference
with the national technical means of verification, the interference issue is cer. tainly problematic. Although this matter merits further elaboration beyond the
confines ofthis chapter, suffice it to say that information operations must be conducted so as to avoid interfering with national verification means during times
other than international armed conflict.
5. Principles of the Law ofArmed Conflict
Readily apparent in this overview of space law applicable to information
operations is that despite all the sophisticated technology involved and the
potential application of additional treaties and consortia agreements, by and
large, the legal principles are the same as those applicable to other places and
means of warfare. Just because military operations are planned for a unique
domain--space--using a unique method-information operations-does not
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change the fundamental legal constraints with which militaries must abide. It is
imperative, as with all military actions, that a particular information operation in
space or affecting a space object be conducted pursuant to a lawful purpose and
in a lawful way. It is this second aspect oflawfulness that raises the issue oflaw of
armed conflict (LOAC) principles. Notwithstanding the claims of some information operations supporters that this method ofwarfare transcends the scope of
existing law, LOAC applies readily to information warfare techniques. 149
Any offensive use of electronic means during military operations would implicate the traditional law of armed conflict principles. These include the counterbalancing principles of military necessity and the avoidance of superfluous
injury, as well as the corollary principles of distinction of combatants from noncombatants, proportionality, and chivalry.150
The principle of military necessity is used to distinguish between what is and
what is not a proper subject of attack. 151 It recognizes that enemy forces, along
with their equipment, are always a proper subject of attack absent some other
overriding LOAC principle. Similarly, civilians and civilian property that make
a direct contribution to the war effort may be attacked, as long as their damage or
destruction would produce a significant military advantage 152 or accomplish a
legitimate military objective. 153 The presence of a dual-use system, commonly
found in the arena ofspace systems, makes targeting analysis more difficult, but it
does not change the fundamental analysis. Dual-use systems complicate the delineation of purely military targets from purely civilian non-targets. Therefore,
targeteers must resist the temptation to attack a civilian computer system, such as
a banking system, university, stock exchange, or similar target, merely because
their attacks may have some vague effect on the enemy.
In a long and protracted conflict, damage to the enemy's economy and research
and development capabilities may well undermine its war effort, but in a short and
limited conflict it may be hard to articulate any expected military advantage from
attacking economic targets. 154

Accordingly, proposals to target civilian information systems must be examined closely to determine whether there is a military necessity for the attack.
Other potential targets requiring close operational and legal analysis could include dual-use systems, such as navigation satellites or public communications
systems, in which the data is provided through an international consortium such
as INTELSAT, EUROSAT, or ARABSAT. Attacking data systems ofinternational consortium organizations will likely affect many users of the data who are
either not parties to the armed conflict or who are declared neutrals. Basically,

288

Douglas S. Anderson and Christopher R. Dooley
the target analysis will be the same when using infonnation operations directed
against space systems as it is using other means against other targets; it willjust be
more complex.
A complementary principle to military necessity is the avoidance ofsuperfluous injury.1SS Intemationallaw "forbids the infliction ofsuffering, injury or destruction not actually necessary for the accomplishment oflegitimate military
purposes. This principle of humanity results in a specific prohibition against unnecessary suffering [and] a requirement ofproportionality. "1S6 It is the principle
of superfluous injury that has led nations to agree to ban certain weapons. 1S7 In
the context ofinfonnation operations, it is difficult to imagine any specific use
that has the potential of causing superfluous injury, but new technologies and
uses require commanders to consider this principle.
Another important LOAC principle, distinction, demands that combatants
be distinguished from noncombatants, and that military objectives be distinguished from protected property or places. 1ss Only combatants and military objectives are to be attacked. 1s9 Additionally, indiscriminate attacks and methods
and means ofcombat are also prohibited. A further aspect ofthis principle is that,
with very limited exceptions, only members of a nation's regular anned forces
are entitled to use force against the enemy.160 To distinguish between combatants and noncombatants, the rule developed that combatants must wear a distinctive unifonn. 161 In the case of an infonnation operation initiated from a
distant computer terminal, there is no practical need for the operator to be in
unifonn. However, this does not mean that the distinction between combatants
and noncombatants during an infonnation operation should not be retained.
If a computer network attack is launched from a location far from its target, it may
be of no practical significance whether the "combatant" is wearing a uniform.
Nevertheless, the law ofwar requires that lawful combatants be trained in the law
of war, that they serve under effective discipline, and that they be under the
command of officers responsible for their conduct. This consideration argues for
retaining the requirement that combatant information operations during
international armed conflicts be conducted only by members of the armed
forces. 162

The principle of proportionality requires that any civilian injury resulting
from a legitimate use ofmilitary force not be disproportionate to the military advantages anticipated. 163 Intemationallaw recognizes that attacks on lawful military targets can result in unavoidable collateral injury and damage to
noncombatants and civilian property. 164 While the commander ordering the
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attack is responsible for making this proportionality judgment, the defender has
a responsibility to properly separate military targets from noncombatants and civilian property.165 Information systems may be legitimate military targets, but an
estimate of collateral damage and the damage from attacking them must take
into account whether, and to what extent, they provide essential services to
noncombatants. 166 This will require thorough intelligence information on an
adversary's computer systems and networks to aid a decision that must be made
on a case-by-case basis.
The final principle, chivalry, prohibits treachery or perfidy during armed
conflict.1 67 It demands a certain amount of fairness in offense and defense, as
well as a certain mutual respect, honor, and trust between opposing forces. 168
When stratagems of war are developed, belligerents must be cautious not to
subvert humanitarian safeguards to effect purely military goals. 169 For example,
using a computer "morphing" technique to create an image of an enemy
leader informing his military that an armistice or cease-fire agreement has been
signed, when in fact no such agreement exists, would be an illegal perfidious
act. 170
Due to the complexity of applying LOAC principles to information operations against space systems, specific targeting proposals should be reviewed and
approved in accordance with the rules of engagement in place and the procedures established by the National Command Authorities (NCA) or the Joint
Force Commander, usually through a Joint Targeting Coordination Board. 17l
Overall, information operations must be conducted consistent "vith the Standing Rules of Engagement (SROE) and may be used in individual or unit
self-defense (as defined in the SROE) or with NCA approval. 172

Application of General Law to Specific Scenarios
Having set forth the general legal framework applicable to information operations conducted in outer space or upon space systems, we now want to apply that
framework to a series of escalating factual scenarios. While we hope these scenarios
are somewhat realistic, they are not intended to imply that the United States or any
other nation engages in such operations or even has the capability to do so.

Scenario 1: Implanting Sniffers and Trap Doors
Nation A has a security organization that obtains information from the
Internet and attempts to gain information from other nations' computers. Nation A is especially concerned with the activities of Nation B, which has been
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hostile in the past. Consequendy, Nation A's security organization has directed
covert activities toward Nation B. Both nations are industrialized and have
well-developed infrastructures. Additionally, both nations have a space program
that includes surveillance and telecommunications satellites with ground-based
downlinks which provide data to the computers.
A security agent of Nation A reports to his supervisors that he has gained access, through the Internet, to the computer system that serves one of Nation B's
unclassified military communications networks. This network uses space assets
to ensure connectivity. He proposes implanting a trap door and "sniffer" that
will, once in-place, remain inert and harmless, but which can be used to monitor
data coming into this network.
Discussion
Obviously, gathering unclassified information readily available to the public is legal. However, implanting a trap door and "sniffer" which can be used to
monitor space communication systems of another nation is more questionable.
Most likely, such intrusions would violate the domestic laws of the offended
State, but there is very litde authority that, during peacetime, it would violate
internationallawP3 This type of information operation is likely to be viewed
much as peacetime espionage is viewed, namely, ofno significant concern unless
serious practical consequences are shown. 174 As such, except for having to
weather the diplomatic costs of protest and political rhetoric by Nation B, assuming they are able to ascribe the intrusion to Nation A, international law neither provides a remedy nor imposes any sanctions.
Specific space law provisions similarly provide no legal restraint on this intrusion. The Outer Space Treaty only applies to activities in outer space, the moon,
and other celestial bodies and is, therefore, not applicable to an intrusion into a
ground system. Assuming Nation B is an ITU member and the system intruded
is a system regulated by the ITU, then some might suggest that the ITC applies.
They would be in error. As noted above, Article 45(1) of the ITC prohibits
"harmful interference"-that which "endangers the functioning" of a radionavigation service or "degrades, obstructs or repeatedly interrupts" a radio communication service. Trap doors and "sniffers" do not degrade, obstruct, or
interrupt communications. Moreover, such a cyber intrusion arguably does not
"endanger the functioning" of the communication service.
Like\vise, such an act would not violate the UN Charter. Implanting a monitoring device that establishes a passageway for future intrusions is all that this information operation entails. Such implanting is akin to a covert intrusion into
the command and control center of another country and placing a monitoring
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device on the phones. This action would neither endanger international peace
and security under Article 2(3) of the UN Charter, nor would it constitute a
threat to the political independence of any State under Article 2(4). While this
type ofcomputer penetration might constitute a threat to the territorial integrity
of a UN member State, it will likely be treated much like espionage, which State
practice has clearly accepted, at least tacitly. As such, it can be accomplished \vith
little risk of prosecution under international law or UN sanction. The fact this
particular intelligence gathering activity is conducted using information operations that impacts data from a space system, rather than more traditional means of
espionage, does not change the basic equation.
In sum, this first scenario does not present any legal obstacles or limitations
under either space law or intemationallaw. Nonetheless, it could be highly volatile in the political arena and would present a delicate policy decision that must
be made by the NCA.

Scenario 2: Interruption of Command and Control Networks
Tensions between A and B increase, but have not risen to the level of armed
conflict. At this point, another security agent from Nation A gains access to one
of B's unclassified military communications networks through the trap door
previously implanted. He temporarily jams the network so that contact \vith B's
orbiting satellites will be interrupted for a period of approximately 30 minutes.
After about twenty minutes, Nation B's space technicians regain control of their
satellite network and restore normal communications. There is no damage to
the satellite or permanent disruption of its functions.

DisCtlssion
Since this has not occurred during an armed conflict, some might argue that interfering with the satellite network ofNation B would constitute a violation ofArticle 45(1) of the ITC ifthe 20-minute interruption ofcommunications is deemed to
be "harmful interference." The ITC definition requires that the interference endanger the functioning of a radionavigation service or other safety service, or seriously degrade, obstruct, or repeatedly interrupt a radio- communication service.
Whether or not a 20-minute interruption of satellite communication constitutes a
serious degradation or obstruction might depend on the precise nature of the communications that were interrupted. For instance, if critical search and rescue systems were interrupted thereby resulting in the loss oflife of Nation B citizens, then
perhaps the interruption would be seen as harmful, even though the space system itself may not have been damaged or harmed.
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Under the UN Charter, there is some legal basis for the proposition that taking control of another nation's communications system or space assets may interfere in the internal affairs of that nation thus violating its rights under the UN
Charter. This would be especially true ifthe interruption resulted in loss oflife as
noted above. It might also be true ifthe space system interrupted was particularly
important to Nation B's defense, such as a missile early warning system. Any determination that rights under the UN Charter were violated or not will depend,
as it will under the lTC, on the precise nature ofthe system that is interrupted. In
this scenario, Nation A's interruption ofone of Nation B's unclassified communication systems was temporary and it did not detract from sensitive military systems. Absent at least resulting moderate damage or injury, an armed response in
self-defense by Nation B would not appear to be justified. Most likely, the primary costs of this scenario would be political in nature.
Scenario 3: Moving an Adversary's Satellite Out of Effective Orbit
Nation A knows that Nation B has a military reconnaissance satellite with
high resolution capability that can provide NationB with critical intelligence on
the movements of Nation A's troops. Nation A is concerned about recent bellicose statements made by Nation B toward Nation A and wants to mobilize several thousand troops along their shared border. In anticipation ofthe outbreak of
armed conflict, Nation A covertly obtains internal access to B's classified military
computer system and uses information operations to send false data instructions
to the Nation B satellite. While this false data does not damage the satellite, it
does cause the satellite to move into another orbit where its surveillance capabilities are rendered completely ineffective.

Discussion
As in the prior two scenarios, there is no physical damage or destruction involved ,vith the satellite or systems of Nation B and armed conflict has not yet
arisen. Unlike Scenario 2 though, this interference with Nation B's military satellite will require Nation B to take steps to "recover" the satellite and restore its
prior orbit before it can be effective. In effect, the satellite has been "kidnapped"
at a militarily critical point, providing Nation A with a distinct military advantage should armed conflict occur.
Since this scenario involves a military satellite and not an INTELSAT system
or asset, the INTELSAT Agreement does not apply. Therefore, there is no requirement under Article XIV (d) of the INTELSAT Agreement ofprior consultation or to provide all relevant data regarding the interference. Furthermore, as
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long as the satellite was not engaged in conducting Nation B's "national technical means of verification" of arms control obligations, the interference would
not violate the ABM Treaty or similar arms control treaty verification provisions,175 assuming A and B were Parties.
The problem raised in this scenario derives again from the UN Charter. Assuming Nation B's satellite is considered part of Nation B's "sovereignty" or
"territorial integrity," Nation A's actions to involuntarily move it out of orbit
could be viewed as a "threat ... against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state" in violation of Article 2(4). If so, the Security Council,
under Article 39, would be authorized to decide what appropriate measures to
take against Nation A to restore international peace and security. Given the national security importance of this reconnaissance satellite to early warning, the
Security Council might determine that this act rises to the level of an "armed attack" sufficient for Nation B to invoke its right of self-defense under Article 51
of the UN Charter. In addition, Nation B might determine independendy that
the action requires it to invoke its inherent right ofself-defense ,vithout waiting
for a UN determination.

Scenario 4: Destruction of Adversary's Satellite
As anticipated, armed conflict has now broken out between Nations A and B.
Nation A's troops, previously amassed along Nation B's border and heavily armed,
have crossed into Nation B. Numerous reports indicate Nation A's troops have
been firing at Nation B's military forces as they approach the nearest town. An
emergency session of the Security Council has been called to address the situation,
but no UN response has yet been authorized. Moreover, since Nation A is a close
ally of a permanent member of the Security Council, a veto of any UN action
against it is anticipated. Nation B's targeteers propose to destroy a key hub in the
space communications system ofNationA and render its connected computers useless. They plan to maneuver one of their own satellites within close range of one of
Nation A's telecommunications satellite. This "killer" satellite has been equipped
with a device that, when activated, will emit an electro-magnetic pulse which will
disable all electronic devices within a ten-mile radius. Destruction of the targeted
satellite, located in geosynchronous orbit over the area ofarmed conflict, will render
Nation A's entire communication system inoperable.

DisCtlssion
This scenario presents a clear armed conflict situation that very likely renders
the Outer Space Treaty, the lTC, and any arms control agreements
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inapplicab1eP6 If there is any doubt as to whether these international agreements were intended to be suspended or terminated during armed conflict, Nation B could make a prior declaration that it considers each of them inapplicable
during this period of armed conflict with Nation A.
Nation B could choose, for policy reasons, to treat this as an "armed attack"
and exercise its right of individual self-defense, or it could treat A's incursion as
"an act ofaggression" under Article 39 of the UN Charter and seek Chapter VII
sanctions through the UN. Before NationB can exercise its right ofself-defense
through use of force, Article 33 of the UN Charter requires it to exhaust any
available peaceful means of setdement, unless, of course, such efforts would be
futile. 177 Seeking action through the Security Council would likely prove fruitless, since Nation A is a close ally of a permanent member with veto authority.
Regardless, Nation B's armed response must be necessary, timely, and proportionate to the wrong suffered. 178
Given the military value to Nation A of this satellite system, there would be
a legitimate military necessity in attacking this space asset. Destruction ofNation
A's satellite would put the military aggressors at a distinct disadvantage in obtaining and disseminating intelligence and communication data without resulting in
loss oflife. Additionally, since the targeted space communications system is used
for military communications, even though it also has a civilian use, there is a legitimate military reason to attack it. The principle of proportionality requires
Nation B's commanders to make their best estimate of the military advantage to
be gained and weigh it against their best estimate of the effect on the civilian
population. The extent of injury or damage to the civilian population from interruption of a communication system through information operations is likely
to be significandy less than from kinetic weapons. Additionally, this particular
information operation, used as a weapon, is neither illegal per se under international1aw, nor are its effects necessarily indiscriminate. Indiscriminate weapons
are those whose effects cannot be controlled, such as chemical and biological
weapons. The ,vide area in which this weapon's effects will be felt do not make it
indiscriminate, especially since its effects will be short-term, and limited to disabling electronic devices.
Readily apparent from each of these scenarios is the importance of making a
case-by-case assessment under international law, and more particularly, LOAC
principles. As with any LOAC assessment, a proper determination of a specific
information operation can only be obtained by applying the specific facts to the
general legal framework. What makes the assessments ofinformation operations
directed at or from space systems more difficult is the lack of extensive State
practice to rely on.
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Practical Considerations in the Application of Information
Operations in Space
In addition to the legal regime applicable to information operations in outer
space, military planners should also factor the unique physical aspects of space
and the political consequences of specific military decisions into their calculations. In this final section, we have attempted to set forth a few such considerations. Keep in mind however, that they are not based on legal constraints, but
rather on the physical properties of outer space and the political climate of the
international community. Additionally, these considerations are not intended to
preclude a commander's discretion as to the appropriate military action to be
taken given the specific military situation faced.
First, any attack upon a physical target in space should seek to disable the
space object without resorting to its physical destruction. Absent the effects of
gravity and friction, fragments from physical destruction of space objects present a significant problem in outer space. Those fragments will naturally spread
throughout the orbital path they came from in an unavoidable pattern that may
not dissipate. Their velocity and mass will make them a threat to our own
space vehicles and satellites. Confining the effects of that debris will be difficult, if not impossible. Certain information operations in space can provide an
alternative to the military planner to outright physical destruction of an adversary's space object by destroying the computer links and data (its life support).
Thus, "killing" of the object may be possible without creating a dangerous
spread of fragments to our own space systems.
Second, if a space system needs to be destroyed, consideration should be given
to destroying it by attacking its ground segment, and thereby severing access to its
"life support." Attacks on ground segments of communications systems have received long-standing public acceptance in the international community as an authorized means of conducting armed conflict as long as the target is a legitimate
military target. A direct attack on a space segment in space, even ifdone consistent
with international law, may not enjoy the same public acceptance. Given the importance of international opinion upon national leaders and their citizens, military
action often attempts to avoid undue public outcry in making target selections.
Therefore, if there is a choice, it may be better to take out an adversary's space object by attacking and destroying its ground segment.
Third, destruction through 'Jamming" of a communication signal is preferable
to destruction ofthe adversary's space object and accomplishes the same result-the
enemy's inability to use that system. Just as ground attacks have received public acceptance, so too has the technique of jamming. It is a common practice during
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anned conflict and is clearly recognized as a legitimate means ofattack. As such, and
for reasons ofavoiding undue public outcry, jamming should be considered as an alternative to the outright physical destruction ofthe space object. Additionally,jamming avoids the problem of unnecessary space debris.
Fourth, a less intrusive electronic means of attack is often preferable to a kinetic kill. Electronic attack can be a better means of avoiding detection while
"masking" the identity of the perpetrator. When subdety or plausible denial is
desired for political reasons, or if there is a need to delay enemy detection of the
attack, electronic means can be very effective. When an adversary's system goes
down, they will not necessarily know it was the result ofan intentional act by an
enemy. This is especially so if the system is left operable, but has been manipulated so that the system data is, or appears to be, false. Depending on the system
attacked, this manipulation can cause military planes to crash, artillery to miss its
target, or enemy leaders to make poor decisions.
No doubt, many other practical approaches to the use of information operations in outer space or directed toward space objects have not been mentioned
here. Those offered are but a limited start for planners and strategists when considering the unique aspects of these two technologically driven realms (information operations and outer space) during armed conflict.

Conclusion
We began this chapter with the observation that when the technological transformations inherent in outer space systems are combined with that of information
operations, yesterday's science fiction can quickly become today's reality. The need
for militaries to keep pace is obvious. These technological transformations will require innovative approaches to an ancient reality--armed conflict between belligerent nations. Information operations and modem space systems have created new
warfighting scenarios that can, in tum, create confusion among military commanders and planners as to what is lawful and what is not. It is imperative that operators
and lawyers forge a partnership to meet this challenge.
As for what is legal in the outer space environment, there are few surprises.
Still relevant is traditional analysis under well-known principles of the law of
armed conflict, customary international law, treaty obligations, and the UN
Charter. Aside from the need to apply the existing analytical framework to new
futuristic threats, there are few legal limitations impacting information operations in or through outer space.
The real challenge comes in understanding the expansion ofinternational political sensitivities to weapons in space and information operations directed at or
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from outer space. During times ofarmed conflict, those sensitivities will not create violations ofinternational law, but they can impede our actions through the
political and diplomatic process. We should not underestimate the degree to
which politics and diplomacy place limits upon otherwise lawful military activity. Thus, with only a few exceptions, from a legal standpoint, information operations in space are virtually no different than those conducted on the ground, in
the air, or at sea. The primary difference lies in the diplomatic and political response of the international community.
Moreover, the "CNN factor" has had a large role to play in the decisions of
military commanders to employ ground, sea, and air assets in recent armed conflicts. We can e:ll..1Ject the influence of the "CNN factor" to growe:ll..1Jonentially
ifmilitary commanders choose to employ information operations against objects
in outer space, a much more sensitive arena. Indeed, because of this, commanders may find their authority to choose targets and the means of attacking those
targets withheld by the NCA in this arena more than any other.
All that aside, however, once the political decision has been made, commanders
should apply the same principles ofintemationallaw they do in more conventional
settings. They must avoid the dizzying distraction created by the vast array of new
technological tools available to the military in the space arena; they must resist the
temptation of expecting that these apparent futuristic tools require a whole new set
oflaws; and they must be willing to apply old laws and principles to new military
scenarios. Ifthey can do that, then tomorrow's commanders can maintain the legal
high ground of warfare, while controlling the military high ground of outer space.
This is not a matter of science fiction; it is reality.
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